Clinical syndromes are not God's gift to cognitive neuropsychology: a reply to a rebuttal to an answer to a response to the case against syndrome-based research.
In this paper we consider several issues about single-patient versus syndrome-based research in response to E. Zurif, D. Swinney, and J. A. Fodor's (1991, Brain and Cognition, 16, 198-210) criticism of A. Caramazza and W. Badecker (1989, Brain and Cognition, 10, 256-295). We argue that these authors have failed to provide convincing arguments in favor of syndrome-based research. In particular, we show that the specific example--a study by D. Swinney, E. Zurif, and J. Nicol (1989, Journal of Cognitive Neurosciences, 1, 25-37)--given by these authors as a demonstration of the usefulness of syndrome-based research to inform theories of normal language processing does not in fact serve this purpose.